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Commander in Chief PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

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Commander in Chief

Pacific fleet and

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

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**CAMPAIGN PLAN
GRANITE**

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CAMPAIGN PLAN GRANITE

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial 0004

13 January 1944.

GRANITE

1. The attached Outline Campaign Plan for operations of the Pacific Ocean Areas during 1944 eventually to establish forces in position to force the surrender of JAPAN has been submitted to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations in compliance with his directive. It is based on the strategic concept approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1943.

2. The Plan is issued for the information of the Major Commanders concerned. Pending action by higher authority it will be utilized as a guide to long range planning. It will be used as a basis for acquiring and preparing forces, and for providing means for their logistic support.

3. The plan is not in itself a directive. Operations required will be covered by specific directives.

C. H. McMORRIS,
Chief of Staff.

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P. V. Mercer
P. V. MERCER,
Flag Secretary.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

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Serial 00019

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

11 February 1944

*Change made
Jewell*

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: DISTRIBUTION LIST.

Subject: Change No. 1 to CinCPOA Secret-Security serial 0004 of 13
January - Campaign Plan GRANITE.

Enclosure: (A) New Page 3 to Appendix C, Campaign Plan GRANITE.

1. The following changes shall be made to all copies of subject
serial:

Appendix C

Page 2 - Section headed "MARIANAS Garrison", second line under
column headed "1 November", change "8 VP" to read "8 VF".

Page 3 - Remove present Page 3 and insert new Page 3.

Page 4 - Paragraph 5, first line headed "Fighters", under
column headed "REQUIRED", change "36" to "35". Same
line, under column headed "Short or Over", change "9"
to "8 short".

Paragraph 5, third line headed "VP", under column
headed "REQUIRED", change "16" to "14". Same line,
under column headed "Short or Over", change "8" to
"6 short".

Paragraph 5, fourth line headed "VS/VSB", under column
headed "REQUIRED", change "15" to "18". Same line
under column headed "Short or Over", change "5" to
"2 over".

Paragraph 5, fifth line headed "VR", under column
headed "N&M", change "4" to "6". Same line under
column headed "Total", change "5" to "8". Same line
under column headed "Short or Over", change "11" to
"8 short".

Appendix E

Change note pertaining to movement of troops during
the period 1 to 15 October to read, "1, 3, 4, 7 Divs.
and 4th Regt TRUK to SOPAC in AP's."

Change notes in columns headed "81st" and "95th" to
read, "Required in HAWAIIAN AREA by 20 September."

C. H. McMORRIS,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as CinCPOA Secret-Security
Serial 0004 of 13 January 1944.

J. V. Mercer
P. V. MERCER,
Flag Secretary.

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS OF THE
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
TO
ESTABLISH FORCES IN POSITION TO FORCE THE
SURRENDER OF JAPAN

PART I --- CONCEPT

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE.

The immediate strategic objective of the forces of the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS is to obtain positions from which the ultimate surrender of JAPAN can be forced by intensive air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary. The ultimate strategic objective is to establish our sea and air power, and if necessary our amphibious forces, in those positions and force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

B. TASKS.

1. General Tasks.

To maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN.

To apply the maximum attrition to JAPAN's air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

To establish and protect sea and air communications which support the positions occupied by all our forces in the PACIFIC OCEAN.

2. Specific Tasks.

To secure control of the MARSHALLS preparatory to a westward advance through the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

To secure control of the CAROLINES and establish a fleet base preparatory to advance northward to the MARIANAS and westward to the PHILIPPINES.

To seize GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS.

To initiate bombing of JAPAN from bases in the MARIANAS.

To assist the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by participation of the South Pacific Force in the seizure of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and EISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

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To support strategically the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA by covering and by destroying or containing enemy fleet forces.

To develop sea and air communications with RUSSIA and make preparations for operations in the NORTH PACIFIC in the event that RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN.

3. Eventual Tasks.

In cooperation with the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, to re-occupy the PHILIPPINES and establish sea communications with CHINA.

To destroy Japanese sea communications by air, surface, and sub-surface attack.

C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

The conduct of operations will be designed to:

- a. Destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date.
- b. Inflict the maximum attrition on enemy air forces.
- c. Intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication.
- d. Enable us to launch shore based and carrier based air attack on JAPAN.
- e. Keep CHINA in the war.
- f. Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take any short cut made possible by developments in the situation.
- g. Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European Theater.

The naval strength currently or prospectively available in the PACIFIC is not sufficient to carry on the operations projected for 1944 without careful timing. All ^{major} SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations subsequent to HANSA-BAY, tentatively set for 1 February 1944, will require both ^{South} direct and indirect support from units of the Pacific Fleet. Likewise, if the operations in the CENTRAL PACIFIC are to progress effectively, and with the momentum necessary, there must be a pooling of assault shipping and at times strong shore

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based air support from NEW GUINEA or the BISMARCKS.

Accordingly, close coordination must exist between the advance of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA along the NEW GUINEA - N.E.I. - PHILIPPINE axis and of the PACIFIC OCEAN AREA westward through the MARSHALLS and northward from the BISMARCKS into the CAROLINES, and thence into the MARIANAS, and eventually into the PHILIPPINES, not only with respect to mutual support but also with respect to sequence and timing in order that the Pacific Fleet may always be available to contain or destroy such enemy fleet forces as may threaten interference.

CCS 417/2 of 23 December 1943 is quoted in part as follows:

"CONCEPT WITHIN THE PACIFIC"

The advance along the NEW GUINEA - N.E.I. - PHILIPPINE axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the MANDATED ISLANDS. These two series of operations will be mutually supporting. United Nations naval forces can be deployed to support successive operations along each axis, and to prevent interference by hostile surface units with simultaneous operations in the two areas. Transfer of forces and resources from one area to the other is contemplated. When conflicts in timing and allocations of means exist, due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the CENTRAL PACIFIC promise at this time a more rapid advance toward JAPAN and her vital lines of communication; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese homeland; and, of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet.

The aim should be to advance along the NEW GUINEA - N.E.I. - PHILIPPINE axis and to complete the capture of the MANDATED ISLANDS in time to launch a major assault in the FORMOSA - LUZON - CHINA area in the spring of 1945 (i.e., before the onset of the typhoon season) from a distant base."

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Control of the MARSHALL ISLANDS will be secured by operations in two phases, designated as FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE. In the first phase, the Central Pacific Force will capture KWAJALEIN ATOLL for use as a fleet anchorage, with air bases at ROI and KWAJALEIN, and will establish a supporting and linking position at IJURO ATOLL. In the second phase, the Central Pacific Force will capture ENWETOK, establish outlying air bases if necessary, and will complete the reduction of the remaining Japanese positions in the MARSHALLS. WAKE and KUSAE will for the time being be neutralized rather than captured.

The amphibious forces for these operations will be mounted in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and in the SAMOA-ELLICE-GILBERT ISLANDS. Shore based air forces will be based initially in the GILBERTS and later at bases seized in the MARSHALLS.

Control of the CAROLINES will be secured by:

- a. The initial seizure of the MORTLOCK ISLANDS and such other positions as reconnaissance may indicate, and their development as advanced air bases to support operations against TRUK.
- b. The capture, occupation, defense, and development of TRUK as a major naval and air base.

The capture of TRUK, after a period of investment and neutralization, will involve a considerable expenditure of time, forces, and logistic resources. Final decision as to the necessity for its capture will depend on the results of preceding operations to reduce enemy fleet strength, upon the results of reconnaissance yet to be obtained, and upon the general situation as it develops. TRUK may be by-passed if the necessary control of the CAROLINES and minimum necessary base facilities can be secured without its capture.

The capture of TRUK will require the use of assault shipping and of naval, air, and amphibious forces from the SOUTH PACIFIC

as well as from the CENTRAL PACIFIC. Amphibious forces will be mounted in the HAWAIIAN and MARSHALL ISLANDS, and in the SOUTH PACIFIC. Direct air support will be provided initially by carrier aircraft, and later by aircraft based at MORTLOCK. Adequate indirect air support will require the employment of heavy bombardment and long range search aircraft operating from bases in EMIRAU and the ADMIRALTIES, as well as from ENIWETOK and other bases in the MARSHALLS. The availability of this support from the SOUTHWEST and SOUTH PACIFIC is a governing consideration in the decision to omit the capture of POMPE, an operation also certain to be costly in expenditure of time, forces, and logistic resources.

The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS will be accomplished by an amphibious operation mounted in the ^{SOLOMON} CAROLINES, MARSHALLS, and HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. Direct air support will be supplied initially by carrier based aircraft. The naval covering, striking, and support forces will be based in the ^{MARSHALL} MARSHALL ISLANDS. Long range aircraft to cover the operation will be based in the ^{BASIN} CAROLINES and at ENIWETOK.

SAIPAN and ^{GUAM} ~~ENIWETOK~~ will be captured initially and activated immediately as air bases to support the assault on ^{GUAM} ~~GUAM~~ and subsequently to support long range air attack on JAPAN. After capture, ^{the Southern MARIANAS} ~~GUAM~~ will be developed as a base for very long range aircraft and for light naval forces and submarines.

The seizure or neutralization of PALAU may subsequently become necessary as a measure to support the westward advance of the Southwest Pacific Forces, to provide us with a position from which to dominate the approaches to the PHILIPPINES from the east, and to obtain a forward base for naval and air forces supporting the reoccupation of the SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES.

If the enemy naval and air strength is sufficiently reduced during preceding operations, or if the means available are increased

[REDACTED]

sufficiently, it may become possible to seize P. LAU and the M. RI-
MAS either in sequence or at approximately the same time, by-
passing TRUK, and thereby greatly accelerate the progress of
the campaign. A successful action may, by decreasing the strength
of forces required to protect lines of communication, justify
the omission of an operation otherwise even as important as the
capture of TRUK.

General strategic support of the operations of the SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREA will be furnished by the projected operations of
the Pacific Fleet and other units of the Central Pacific Force
in the MANDATES, to the extent that they contain or destroy enemy
naval and air forces. In addition, the operations of carrier
striking forces and heavy covering forces will be so timed as to
prevent enemy fleet forces from interfering with operations in the
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC during critical periods.

During periods between amphibious operations, carrier strik-
ing forces will be employed to deliver destructive attacks on
selected vital targets in a manner calculated to reduce enemy
naval and air strength, to prepare for further operations, and to
disorganize the enemy defensive preparations.

All operations will be so conducted as to maintain maximum
readiness to take advantage of opportunities to bring important
enemy naval forces to action.

Throughout the year the submarines available will be used
primarily to inflict attrition on naval forces and shipping and
will be directed to scouting, observation, and rescue services
only in cases of urgent necessity.

The reoccupation of the PHILIPPINES is essential to the
attainment of the ultimate strategic objective. The establish-
ment of strong fleet units in the PHILIPPINES and their operation
in coordination with strong bomber forces will cut the enemy

lines of communication with areas to the southward. Fleet units can be based in the SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES prior to the recapture of LUZON. After LUZON is captured, MANILA BAY will be a suitable major fleet base for further operations against JAPAN. The establishment of naval and air units in LUZON will facilitate effectively the reopening of lines of communications into the SOUTH CHINA SEA from both the PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEANS, and the establishment of sea communications which will provide support for ground and air forces operating in CHINA.

The North Pacific Force will carry out naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet. Base facilities and defensive installations in the ALEUTIANS will be augmented in preparation for entry into the KURILES and SOVIET territory in the event of Soviet collaboration. Preparations will be made for executing very long range strategic bombing against the KURILES and northern JAPAN. In the event of the U.S.S.R. entering the war, operations in the NORTH PACIFIC will assume greatly increased importance and may involve a major redeployment of forces.

D. SEQUENCE AND TIMING.

The sequence and timing of operations approved for the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS and of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations requiring the support of major Pacific Fleet units is tentatively set as follows:

<u>Operation</u>		<u>Tentative Target Date</u>
FLINTLOCK	Capture of KWAJALEIN	31 January 1944
HAILSTONE-FOREARM	Air attack on TRUK Capture of EMIRAU	24 March 1944
MERCANTILE	Capture of MANUS	24 March 1944
CATCHPOLE	Capture of ENIWETOK	1 May 1944
GYMKHANA-ROADMAKER	Capture of TRUK and MORTLOCK	1 August 1944
FORGER	Capture of TINIAN, SAIPAN, and GUAM	1 November 1944.

The foregoing sequence and timing is purely tentative. It can be accelerated if means become available more rapidly than is now anticipated. A major fleet action, although it may delay amphibious operations for a brief period, will greatly accelerate them thereafter.

PART II - OPERATIONS

A FLINTLOCK

PURPOSES

To prepare to gain control of the CAROLINES.

To inflict losses on the enemy.

To improve the security of the lines of communications.

To support other operations in the PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEANS by extending the pressure on the Japanese.

TASKS

a. Organize and train forces.

b. Secure control of the MARSHALL ISLANDS, by capturing, occupying, defending and developing bases therein.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Control of the MARSHALL ISLANDS will be secured by operations in two phases designated as FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE.

Prior to FLINTLOCK air forces based on shore in the GILBERTS and ELLICE islands will conduct sustained air attacks against enemy positions in the MARSHALLS with WOTJE, MALOELAP and MILLE as their primary targets. Immediately prior to the first landings the shore based air forces will shift their primary targets to KWAJALEIN and all enemy air bases will receive destructive attacks by both shore and carrier based aircraft and by surface gunfire.

Amphibious forces mounted at PEARL and on the WEST COAST will capture KWAJALEIN and ROI ISLANDS and will defend and develop the KWAJALEIN ATOLL as a major fleet anchorage with two air bases. Meanwhile WOTJE, MALOELAP and MILLE will be neutralized by sustained air attack and by ship bombardment as required.

After the capture of KWAJALEIN is ensured MAJURO ATOLL will be occupied and developed as a supporting position including one or two airfields.

Principal fleet units will remain within covering distance of the MARSHALLS until the ground and aircraft garrisons of KWAJALEIN and MAJURO become effective.

Remaining enemy positions will be reduced by surface and air attack, by sea and air blockade, and by capture when assault forces are available.

FORCES REQUIRED

<u>NAVAL</u>	<u>GROUND</u>	<u>AIR</u>
8. BB	2 Divisions	<u>Army</u>
7 OBB	2 Regimental CTs.	1½ Gp VBH
6 CV	5 Defense Bns.	1 Gp VBM
6 CVL	2 JASCos	3/4 Gp VF
8 CVE		¼ Gp VSB
12 CA		¼ Gp VR
6 CL		<u>Marine</u>
91 DD		2 Gp VMF
23 DE		½ Gp VMSB
8 AM		¼ Gp VR
25 APA		<u>Navy</u>
15 AP		½ Gp VBH
7 AKA		½ Gp VBM
16 AK		3/4 Gp VP
5 LSD		¼ Gp VD
43 LST		½ Gp VSB
37 LCI		
33 LCT		
1 AGC		
832 LVT (Cargo)		
206 LVT (Tank)		
250 DUKW		

B HAILSTONE

PURPOSES

To inflict attrition on the Japanese Fleet and air forces.

To support the capture of MANUS and EMIRAU.

To obtain close reconnaissance of the TRUK ATOLL and the enemy installations and defenses therein.

TASKS

Attack enemy naval and air forces in the TRUK ATOLL.

Destroy or contain Japanese naval forces in the MANDATED ISLANDS.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

After the completion of FLINTLOCK certain carriers and supporting ships will be sent to the South Pacific Force for direct participation in the capture and occupation of MANUS and EMIRAU ISLANDS. The other carriers together with the fast battleships and supporting ships, as soon as the ground and air garrisons in the MARSHALLS are effective, will return to bases at PEARL and in the SOUTH PACIFIC and prepare for further offensive operations. Some light forces will be required to remain in the MARSHALLS and GILBERTS to support the newly established positions and their sea communications.

At a date selected to afford maximum strategic support to the operations against EMIRAU and MANUS, the strongest practicable carrier striking force with available fast battleships and light forces in company will approach TRUK and deliver an all-out attack on available targets in the order: aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers. Concurrently submarines will be concentrated in the approaches to TRUK for observation purposes and to attack enemy ships which may sortie during the operation. Thereafter until the MANUS and EMIRAU operations are secure against interference of enemy fleet units the striking force will operate to destroy or contain the enemy naval forces in the MANDATES, repeating the attack on TRUK if the situation warrants.

NAVAL FORCES REQUIRED FOR HAILSTONE

8 BB	6 CVL	8 CL
6 CV	8 CA	48 DD
		12 SS

NAVAL FORCES FROM CENTRAL PACIFIC REQUIRED FOR MERCANTILE-FOREARM
REINFORCEMENTS.

1 CV	21 DD	3 LSD
2 CVL	8 DE	130 LVT (Cargo)
6 CVE	13 APA	75 LVT (Tank)
4 OBB	4 AKA	

NAVAL FORCES REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION OF THE MARSHALLS.

3 CVE	9 DD	8 AM
4 CA	8 DE	

CATCH-
POLE

C. CATCHPOLE

PURPOSES

To prepare to gain control of the CAROLINES and MARIANAS.

To improve the security of our position in the MARSHALLS.

To inflict losses on the enemy.

To support other operations in the PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEANS by extending pressure on the Japanese.

TASKS

Capture the ENIWETOK ATOLL and defend and develop it as an air base and a fleet anchorage.

Occupy and develop supporting positions in the MARSHALLS as required.

Reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air bases at KUSAIE and WAKE by air attack and ship gunfire.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The seizure of ENIWETOK ATOLL and the subsequent occupation of UJELANG ATOLL are visualized as falling into four phases as follows:

(a) Softening up of remaining enemy bases in the MARSHALLS by shore based air operations from KWAJALEIN, MAJURO and the GILBERTS, with emphasis on the early neutralization of MILLE, MALOELAP and WOTJE.

(b) A single destructive raid on WAKE ATOLL by carrier aircraft and surface ship bombardment, followed immediately by repeated carrier air strikes against ENIWETOK and PONAPE, and KUSAIE if necessary, supported by shore based aircraft, for the purpose of gaining control of the air in the immediate area, and interdicting the flow of aerial reinforcement from the westward.

(c) Final bombardment of the assault objectives by carrier and shore based aircraft, and by heavy concentrations of surface fire support groups, closely synchronized with the seizure of successive island objectives by the assault forces.

[REDACTED]

(d) Consolidation of the seizure of the Atoll and occupation of UJELANG under the continuing support of carrier and shore based aircraft and of all available surface combatant units.

The development of the objective is designed to provide airfields on ENGEBI, ENIWETOK, and UJELANG ISLANDS. In view of the exposed location of these atolls, and the consequent threat of possible counter assault by the enemy from such nearby bases as PONAPE and TRUK, it is necessary that surface forces adequate to repel any concentration of enemy naval strength be retained in the area until these air fields are in operation.

Amphibious forces will be mounted in PEARL and at advanced bases, utilizing transports not required in the FOREARM operation. The target date is therefore governed chiefly by the availability of combatant ships. The target date for MERCANTILE-FOREARM- HAILSTONE on 24 March should permit combatant ships to depart that area 5 April; they could then reach their bases by 14 April and be ready to participate in covering the passage of assault forces from PEARL by 23 April. If it becomes necessary to keep large forces in the CAROLINES for a longer period some delay may result.

The assault will comprise landings on the islands of ENIWETOK and ENGEBI followed by consolidation of the remaining islands of the atoll and by occupation and development of outlying positions required. UJELANG will probably be developed as a fighter field to support operations against PONAPE.

FORCES REQUIRED

<u>Naval</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air</u>
8 BB	2 Divisions (less 1 combat team)	<u>Army</u>
7 OBB	3 Defense Bns.	1½ Gp VBH
6 CV	2 JASCOs	1 Gp VBM
6 CVL		1 Gp VF
8 CVE		¼ Gp VSB
12 CA		¼ Gp VR
6 CL		¼ Gp VP
110 DD		<u>Marine</u>
30 DE		2 Gp VMF
12 SS		½ Gp VMSB
8 AM		¼ Gp VR
20 APA		<u>Navy</u>
15 APD		¾ Gp VBH
20 AP		½ Gp VBM
5 AKA		¾ Gp VP
15 AK		¼ Gp VD
4 LSD		½ Gp VSB
40 LST		
30 LCI		
2 AGC		
30 LCT		
12 LCC		
520 LVT (Cargo)		
131 LVT (Tank)		
150 DUKW		

GYMKHANA -
ROADMAKER

GYMKHANA 12 ROADMAKER

PURPOSES

To provide an advanced naval base in the Western Pacific.
To secure control of the CAROLINES.
To prepare to gain control of the MARIANAS.
To support other operations in the PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEANS by extending pressure on the Japanese.

TASKS

Seize the MORTLOCK Islands.
Seize additional suitable positions as necessary and available, and develop advanced air bases to support operations against TRUK.
Capture, occupy, defend and develop the TRUK ATOLL as a major advanced naval and air base.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Control of the CAROLINES will be secured by seizing the MORTLOCK Islands and other positions suitable for the development of airfields (GYMKHANA) concurrently with the initiation of operations against TRUK (ROADMAKER). Airfields will be developed on the positions seized in GYMKHANA to support the step-by-step advance through TRUK ATOLL. Temporary naval anchorages and base facilities will be developed as the operations progress.

Prior to GYMKHANA-ROADMAKER, air forces based ashore in the BISMARCKS will conduct sustained air attacks against MORTLOCK, TRUK, and other targets as required. Air forces based in the MARSHALLS will conduct sustained attacks against PONAPE and against KUSAIE as necessary.

Landing operations against TRUK will be supported by sustained carrier operations. Striking forces and submarines will engage and destroy Japanese forces that may attempt to intervene in the operation.

Amphibious forces for these operations will be mounted in HAWAII and the BILMARCK-SOLOMON area.

Target date for CATCHPOLE has been tentatively set as 1 May with a likelihood of some delay. Therefore, target date for GYNKHANA-ROADMAKER should be about 1 August in order to allow sufficient time for the movement of forces to mounting positions and for movement and voyage repairs of ships after CATCHPOLE.

Five divisions plus a Marine Raider regiment will be required for GYNKHANA-ROADMAKER. Two Marine divisions and the Marine Raider regiment will be available in the South Pacific. One Marine and two Army divisions will be available in the HAWAIIAN AREA. It will be desirable to spearhead the attack with the three Marine divisions and the Raider regiment. These forces should be mounted in the South Pacific. This will require the movement of one Marine division to the South Pacific prior to mounting the operation.

The scheme of maneuver for ROADMAKER visualizes the seizure of TOL ISLAND initially, followed by a step-by-step advance through the other islands of the atoll. Therefore, troops should arrive in echelon. The three Marine divisions and the Raider regiment are considered adequate for the first echelon and can be lifted simultaneously. The first echelon will be mounted from the South Pacific while the second echelon consisting of two Army divisions should be mounted in HAWAII at such a time as will enable them to arrive in TRUK at approximately D plus 30 days. It is estimated that two months will be required to complete this operation.

FORCES RECOMMENDED

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air</u>
5071		
8 BB	5 Divisions	<u>Army</u>
9 CBP	1 Marine Regt. (Raider)	7 Gp VB(H)
8 CV	6 Defense Bns.	2 Gp VB(M)
8 CVL	5 JASCO's	3 Gp VF
24 CVE		1 Gp VR
14 CA		$\frac{1}{4}$ Gp VD
14 CL		<u>Marine</u>
120 DD		3 Gp VMF
30 DE		1 Gp VR
12 SS		1 Gp VBM
3 AGC		<u>Navy</u>
16 AM		1 $\frac{3}{4}$ Gp VB(H) search
40 APA		1 Gp VB(M) search
20 APD		$1\frac{1}{2}$ Gp VP
30 AP		$\frac{1}{4}$ Gp VD
12 AKA		1 $\frac{3}{4}$ Gp VSB
30 AK		
5 LSD		
60 LST		
16 LCC		
60 LCI		
60 LCT		
1664 LVT (Cargo)		
395 LVT (Tank)		
550 DUKW		

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E. FORAGER.

PURPOSES

To establish bases from which to:

- (a) Initiate bombing of JAPAN.
- (b) Attack Japanese sea communications.
- (c) Support further advance into the PHILIPPINES, FORIOSA, and CHINA.

To maintain unrelenting military pressure against JAPAN.

To extend our control over the WESTERN PACIFIC.

TASKS

a. Capture, occupy, and defend TINIAN, SAIPAN and GUAM and develop bases in these islands.

b. Gain control of the remaining JAPANESE MARIANAS.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

The MARIANAS will be secured by operations in three phases. If the strategic situation and availability of means is sufficiently favorable the second phase may be omitted and GUAM, SAIPAN and TINIAN captured simultaneously.

Phase I

Seize TINIAN and SAIPAN and develop air bases thereon from which to support the seizure of GUAM. Air and surface bombardment of the objectives by major portions of the carrier and battleship units of the Pacific Fleet with attached light forces will precede the assault in order to reduce the strength of the defense. Shore based aviation from the CAROLINES and ENIWETOK will assist in these operations. Direct air support for the assault will be provided by carrier based aircraft. Naval covering, striking, and support forces will be based in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES. Amphibious forces consisting of a corps of three divisions and corps troops will be mounted in HAWAII. Units required to activate bases for aviation to be

employed against GUAM will accompany assault forces. It is estimated that forces can be ready for the initial assault on 1 November, which is therefore selected as the target date.

Phase II

Seize GUAM after preliminary bombardments by fleet units, carrier based aviation, and heavy attacks by shore based aviation operating from SAIPAN and TINIAN.

Assault forces for this phase will consist of a corps of two divisions mounted in HAWAII and augmented in the forward area by other units previously employed in Phase I.

Considering the time required to complete the capture of TINIAN and SAIPAN and to activate airfields on these islands, and the necessity for preliminary bombardments, it is estimated that the assault can be made with direct support from shore based aviation by 15 December 1944.

Phase III

During this phase the operations necessary to ensure our complete control of the MARIANAS will be carried out. These operations will be conducted by our occupation forces, operating from SAIPAN, TINIAN and GUAM. Bases to be used by very long range air-craft in bombarding JAPAN will be developed during this phase.

FORCES REQUIRED

<u>Naval</u>		<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air</u>	
			<u>Army</u>	<u>Marine</u>
8 BB	36 APA	5 Divisions	6 Gp VBH	3 Gp VMF
9 OBB	20 APD	9 Defense Bns.	1 Gp VBM	1 3/4 Gp VR
8 CV	30 AP	5 JASCO's	1 3/4 Gp VF	
8 CVL	12 AKA			
24 CVE	30 AK			
14 CA	6 LSD		2 Gp VR	1 Gp VBH
14 CL	60 LST		5 Gp VBVH	1 1/4 Gp VP
120 DD	16 LCC		(Occu- pation)	1/4 Gp VD
30 DE	60 LCI		1/2 Gp VD	1 1/4 Gp VSB
12 SS	60 LCT			1 Gp VBM
3 AGC	1550 LVT (Cargo)			
8 AM	375 LVT (Tank)			
	500 DUKW			

SHIRLEY-
MATE

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F. STALEMATE. (Alternate to ROADMAKER)

ASSESSMENT

That reconnaissance shows that the losses that will be involved in the capture of TRUK are unacceptable, while the losses involved in the capture of PALAU are considerably less, and a decision is made to neutralize the CAROLINES by operations that do not involve the capture of TRUK.

That the balance of naval strength is so favorable as to permit effective defense of the lines of communication to the Western Pacific without the capture or local neutralization of TRUK.

That the forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA have secured control of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far as GEELVINK BAY.

PURPOSES

To provide an advanced base in the Western Pacific.

To prepare to secure control of the MARSHALLS and thereby neutralize the CAROLINES.

To support the forward advance of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC forces.

To support other operations in the PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEANS.

To prepare to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES.

TASKS

Destroy or contain Japanese naval and air forces in the Mandated Islands.

Capture, occupy, defend and develop PALAU as an advanced naval and air base.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Prior to STALEMATE, air forces based in NEW GUINEA will complete reconnaissance of the WESTERN CAROLINES and PALAU ISLANDS and will conduct preliminary bombardment of enemy bases as required. Air forces based in the MARSHALLS and the BISMARCKS will conduct

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supporting bombardment operations against TRUK to inflict attrition on the enemy naval and air forces and for purpose of deception as to the next assault objective.

The assault on PALAU will be given direct support by sustained carrier operations and by surface bombardment. The major Japanese naval forces still in being will be destroyed or contained by the operations of carriers, battleships and attached light forces and also by submarine concentrations in the vicinity of their bases.

Four divisions plus a Marine Raider Regiment will be required for STALEMATE. Two Marine divisions and the Marine Raider Regiment will be available in the South Pacific. One Marine and two Army divisions will be available in the Hawaiian Area.

The scheme of maneuver for STALEMATE visualizes the seizure of BABELTHUAP ISLAND by landings effected on the north and east coasts, then neutralization of base facilities to its southward by shore based artillery preparatory to a step-by-step advance to seize the islands to the south to control the entire group. The ~~northwest~~^{southwest} monsoon blows from July to November, therefore a target date of 1 August will be favorable for the above landings because it will permit them to be effected on lee shores.

Appendix A.SUMMARY OF GROUND FORCESFLINTLOCK

<u>Name</u>	<u>Location</u>
4th Marine Division	West Coast
7th Infantry Division	Hawaii
22nd Marine Combat Team	Hawaii
106th Infantry Combat Team	Hawaii
1st Marine Defense Battalion	Hawaii
14th Marine Defense Battalion	South Pacific
15th Marine Defense Battalion	Hawaii
3rd Army Defense Battalion	Hawaii
4th Army Defense Battalion	Hawaii

CATCHPOLE

<u>Name</u>	<u>Location</u>
2nd Marine Division	Hawaii
27th Infantry Division (less 106th Inf. C.T.)	Hawaii
1st Army Defense Battalion	Hawaii
2nd Army Defense Battalion	Hawaii
5th Army Defense Battalion	Hawaii

GYMKHANA-ROADMAKER

<u>Name</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Marine Division	Southwest Pacific
3rd Marine Division	South Pacific
4th Marine Division	Hawaii to South Pacific
4th Marine Regiment (Raider)	South Pacific
7th Infantry Division	Hawaii
77th Infantry Division	To be made available
12th Marine Defense Battalion	Southwest Pacific
4th Marine Defense Battalion	South Pacific

GYMKHANA-ROADMAKER cont.

Name

9th Marine Defense Battalion
10th Marine Defense Battalion
18th Marine Defense Battalion
6th Army Defense Battalion

Location

South Pacific
South Pacific
To be made available
Hawaii

FORAGER

Name

2nd Marine Division
5th Marine Division
27th Infantry Division
81st Infantry Division
95th Infantry Division
1st Marine Defense Battalion
2nd Marine Defense Battalion
5th Marine Defense Battalion
7th Marine Defense Battalion
8th Marine Defense Battalion
17th Marine Defense Battalion
11th Marine Defense Battalion
3rd Marine Defense Battalion
19th Marine Defense Battalion

Location

Hawaii
To be made available
Hawaii
To be made available
To be made available
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
South Pacific
South Pacific
To be made available

GRANITE

Recapitulation:

5 Marine Divisions
1 Marine Regiment (Raider)
5 Army Divisions
16 Marine Defense Battalions
6 Army Defense Battalions

Total:

10 Divisions
1 Regiment (Raider)
22 Defense Battalions.

JASCOS REQUIRED

OPERATION	Joint Assault Signal Companies							
	In Operation		Rehabilitating		Total Required			
	Army	Marine	Army	Marine	Army	Marine		
FLINTLOCK	1	1	-	-	1	1		
CATCHPOLE	1	1	1	1	2	2		
GYMKHANA- ROADMAKER	2	3	1	1	3	4		
FORAGER	3	2	2	3	5	5		

NAVAL

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF NAVAL FORCES REQUIRED
 (Ship based aircraft included)

TYPE	PHASE III JAN. 1944	PHASE IV MARCH-JUNE 1944			PHASE V JULY-NOV. 1944	PHASE VI NOV. 1944
	FLINTLOCK	HAIL- STONE	CATCH- POLE	TOTAL *** PHASE IV	GYAKHANA- ROADMAKER	FORAGER
BB	8	8	8	8	8	8
OBB	7		7	7	9	9
CV	6	6	6	7	8	8
CVL	6	6	6	8	8	8
CVE	8		8	14	24	24
CA	12	8	12	12	14	14
CL	6	8	6	8	14	14
DD	91	48	110	110	120	120
DE	23		30	30	30	30
SS		12	12	12	12	12
AM	8		8	8	16	8
APA	25		20	33/4*	40/8*	36/16*
APD			15	15/3*	20/5*	20/5*
AP	15		20	20	30	30
AKA	7		5	9	12/2*	12/4*
AK	16		15	15	30	30
AGC	1		2	2	3	3
LST	43		40	54/12*	60/60*	60/60*
LCC			12	12/2*	16/2*	16/2*

TYPE	PHASE III JAN. 1944	PHASE IV, MARCH-JUNE 1944			PHASE V JULY-NOV. 1944	PHASE VI NOV. 1944
	FLINTLOCK	HAIL- STONE	CATCH- POLE	TOTAL *** PHASE IV	GYMKHANA- ROADMAKER	FORAGER
LCI	37		30	30/8*	60/60*	60/60*
LCT	33		30	30/20*	60/60*	60/60*
LSD	5		4	4	5	6
LVT(Cargo)	832**		520**	650**	1664**	1550**
LVT(Tank)	206**		131**	206**	395**	375**
DUKW	250**		150**	150**	550**	500**

* This figure includes assault shipping required for consolidation of recently captured positions, for troop training, and that estimated to be under repair, in addition to that required for current offensives.

** Plans contemplate using LVT Battalions on alternate operations insofar as practicable. This permits use of alternate vehicles for training. Figures are based upon a replacement of 40% of vehicles after each operation, in addition to the normal replacement of 25% per quarter.

*** Includes temporary allocation of certain units to SOPAC for use in FOREARM.

AIR

Appendix C.Summary of Total Requirements for Shore Based Air Forces (by squadrons)for Central Pacific Operations 1944 - GRANITE1. Central Pacific Aircraft Requirements.

Base	1 Aug. - 1 Oct. Operations against TRUK	1 Sept. - 1 Nov. Occupation of TRUK	1 November Occupation of MARIANAS
HAWAIIAN IS.	5 VF	5 VF	5 VF
MIDWAY	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)
JOHNSTON	4 VP	4 VP	4 VP
	5 VSB	5 VSB	5 VSB
	1 VR	1 VR	1 VR
	2 VB(H)	2 VB(H)	2 VB(H)
GILBERTS	2 VF		
	1 VB(H) search	1 VB(M) search	1 VB(M) search
	1 VB(M) search		
	1 VP	1 VP	1 VP
	2 VSB	1 VSB	1 VSB
	1 VMR(M)		
	1 VR(A)	1 VMR	1 VMR
	2 VB(H)(A)		
MARSHALLS			
KWAJALEIN	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)
	3 VF	2 VF	2 VF
	2 VB(H) search		
	2 VD photo	1 VB(M) search	1 VB(M) search
	1 VMR(M)	2 VMR(M)	1 VMR(M)
	1 VR(A)		1 VR(A)
	1 VP	1 VP	1 VP
	1 VSB	1 VSB	1 VSB
	2 VB(H)(A)		
MAJURO	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)
	2 VF	1 VF	1 VF
	2 VSB	1 VSB	1 VSB
	1 VB(M) search	1 VB(M) search	1 VB(M) search
ENIWETOK	$\frac{1}{2}$ VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)	1 VF(nite)
	2 VF	2 VF	1 VF
	1 VP	1 VP	
	4 VB(M)(A)	2 VB(M)(A)	2 VB(H) search
	2 VB(H) search	2 VB(H) search	1 VP
UJELANG	$\frac{1}{2}$ VF(nite)		
	2 VF	1 VF	
NORTLOCK and other supporting bases*	2 VF(nite)		
	8 VF	2 VF	
	2 VSB		
	8 VM		
	1 VP(Dumbo)	2 VB(M)	

* Units used will depend on number of airfields actually developed.

SECRET

Base	1 Aug. - 1 Oct.	1 Sept. - 1 Nov.	1 November
TRUK Attack:			
Based in BISMARCKS	2 VP PBV-5(Dumbo) 2 VB(M) Search 24 VB(H)(A) 2 VB(H) search 2 VR 2 VMR		
TRUK Garrison			
ETEN		3 VD(photo) 2 VF	2 VD(photo) 2 VF
DUBLON		2 VF(nite) 6 VB(H)(A)	2 VF(nite) 6 VB(H)(A)
HOEN		2 VP 2 VB(H) search 2 VF 1 VB(M) search 4 VMR(H) 8 VR(A)	2 VP 2 VB(H)(A) 2 VF 1 VB(M) search 4 VMR(H) 8 VR(A)
UMAN		6 VB(H)	4 VB(M)(A)
TOL		2 VF 6 VB(H)	2 VF 4 VB(H)
FEFAN		6 VB(H) 2 VSB	1 VB(H) search 2 VSB
MARIANAS Garrison:	to be available for installation after capture		2 VF(nite) 8 VF 2 VMSB 3 VBH search 20 VB(H)

2. Central Pacific Operating Aircraft Requirements plus Reserves.

	1 Aug - 1 Oct.			1 Sept - 1 Nov.			1 November		
	Oper.	Res.	Tot.	Oper.	Res.	Tot.	Oper.	Res.	Tot.
Fighters (day)	24	12	36	19	8	27	23	12	35
Fighters (nite)	6	3	9	6	3	9	8	4	12
VP	10	5	15	9	4	13	9	5	14
VSB	12	6	18	10	5	15	12	6	18
VR	9		9	16		16	16		16
VB(H) search	7	3	10	4	2	6	6	3	9
Photo	2	2	4	3	2	5	2	2	4
VB(M) search	4	2	6	4	2	6	4	2	6
VB(H) Army or Marine	12	6	18	4	2	6	4	2	6
VB(H) Army	30	7	37	26	6	32	14	3	17
VB(VH) Army							20		20

3. Central Pacific Availability. 1 August to 1 October.

In this paragraph and paragraphs 4 and 5, availability of Naval and Marine aircraft is in accordance with CominCh secret serial 002224 of 13 October 1943, subject: Tentative Deployment Navy and Marine Shore-based Squadrons. Availability of Army aircraft is in accordance with C.C.S. 428 of 15 December 1943.

	<u>N & M</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>REQUIRED</u>	<u>Short or Over</u>
Fighters	15	9	24	36	12 short
Fighters (nite)	2	1	3	9	6 short
Patrol	10		10	15	5 short
VS/VSB	17		17	18	1 short
VR	3	2	5	9	4 short
VBH (search)	4		4	10	6 short
Photo	2	2	4	4	---
VBM (search)	3		3	6	3 short
VBM Army/Mar.	4	4	8	18	10 short
VBH		12	12	37	25 short

4. Central Pacific Availability. 1 September to 1 November.

	<u>N & M</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>REQUIRED</u>	<u>Short or Over</u>
Fighters	15	9	24	27	3 short
Fighters (nite)	2	1	3	9	6 short
Patrol	10		10	13	3 short
VS/VSB	17		17	15	2 over
VR	3	2	5	16	11 short
VB(H) search	4		4	6	2 short
Photo	2	2	4	5	1 short
VBM (search)	3		3	6	3 short
VB(M) Army/Mar.	4	4	8	6	2 over
VB(H)		10	10	32	22 short

Pac-125-ff

5. Central Pacific Availability.

1 November.

	<u>N & M</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>REQUIRED</u>	<u>Short or Over</u>
Fighters	18	9	27	28 35	8 short
Fighters (nite)	4	1	5	12	7 short
VP	8		8	13 14	6 short
VS/VSB	20		20	22 18	2 over
VR	6 6	2	8 8	16	8 short
VB(H) search	4		4	9	5 short
Photo	2	2	4	4	- ----
VB(M) search	3		3	6	3 short
VR(M) Army/Mar.	4	4	8	6	2 over
VB(H)		10	10	17	7 short
VB(VH)		20	20	20	- ----

Note: There will probably be 3 additional VB(VH) groups available 1 January 1945.

APPENDIX "L"Base Service Requirements for Central
Pacific Operations 1944 - GRANITE1. CATCHPOLE

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	<u>Date Required</u>	
					At Target	Ready
ENIWETOK	Fleet An- chorage Air Base	Navy	Navy	1 Acorn (N)	D	D-75
				1/2 Construc- tion Bn (N)	D	D-75
				1 Argus (N)	D	D-75
				1 Casu (N)	D	D-75
				2 Gropacs (#6 & #7)	D	D-75
				2 Comm Units JCS-488	D	D-75
				1 Hq Sq MAG (M)	D	D-75
				1 Serv Sq MAG (M)	D	D-75
				1 PT Oper Base (Ell)	D plus 15	D-60
UJELANG	Air Base	Army	Army	1 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D	D-75
				1 Avn Engr Bn (A)	D	D-75
				1 Port Co (A)	D	D-75
				1 Gropac (#8A)	D	D-75
				1 Comm Unit JCS-488	D	D-75
				1 Hosp 250 Bed (A)	D	D-75
				1 Det Hq Sq MAG (M)	D	D-75
				1 Det Serv Sq MAG (M)	D	D-75
				1 PT Oper Base (Ell)	D plus 15	D-60

APPENDIX "L"

2. GYMKHANA - ROAD MAKER

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
MORTLOCK	Airbase (1 field)	Army	Army	1 Avn Engr Bn (A)	D	D-60
				1 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D	D-60
				1 Comm Unit JCS-488	D	D-60
				1 Gropac*	D	D-60
				1 Hosp 150 Beds (A)	D	D-60
Another locality to be chosen	Airbase (2 fields)	Marine Navy		2 Acorns	D	D-60
				2 Gropacs*	D	D-60
				1 Hq Sq MAG (M)	D	D-60
				1 Serv Sq MAG (M)	D	D-60
				2 AW Sq (M)	D	D-60
TRUK	Major Advanced Fleet Base and Air Base			1 Hq Sq MAG (M)	D	D-60
				1 Serv Sq MAG (M)	D	D-60
TRUK ATOLL		Navy	-	1 AW Sq (M)	D	D-60
TOL		Marine	Marine	2 Avn Eng Bn (M)	D	D-60
FEFAN		Navy	Navy	1 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D	D-60
UMAN		Army	Army			
DUBLON-ETEN		Navy	Navy			
MOEN		Army	Army	2 Gropacs *	D	D-60
				(N)		
				3 L/C Maintenance Units (E10 & E9) (N)	D	D-60
				1 Comm Unit #19 JCS-488	D	D-60
				1 Tank Farm 40,000 Bbl (H14A) (N)	D	D-60

* See Page 8

APPENDIX "L"

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Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
				1 CB Special (F-1) Additional (N)	D	D-60
				1 Hq & Hq Sq Hvy Bomb Grp (A)	D plus 15	D-45
				3 Hosp 500 Bed (A)	D plus 15	D-45
				2 Casu (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				2 Acorns (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				4 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Hq Sq MAG (Reinf) (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Serv Sq MAG (Reinf) (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Patsu (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				3 Comm Units #16, 17, 18 JCS-488	D plus 30	D-30
				4 Avn Eng Bn (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				4 Tank Farms 40,000 Bbl (H14A) (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				Facilities for Atoll Headquarters	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Hq Sq VMR Grp (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Serv Sq VMR Grp (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				2 Eng Reg Gen Serv (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 PT Oper Base (E11)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Port Bn (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				2 Port Develop. Unit (P-8)	D plus 30	D-30

APPENDIX "L"

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
				1 Amph. Rep. Base (E6)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Lion with all CB's	D plus 30	D-30
				3 Hq. & Hq Sq Bomb Grp Hvy (A)	D plus 45	D-15
				1 Marine Field Depot (M)	D plus 60	D
				1 Acorn	D plus 60	D
				1 AMF Gen Depot (A)	D plus 60	D
				2 Bakery Co (A)	D plus 60	D
				2 Laundry Co (A)	D plus 60	D
				1 Avn Over- haul (H3) (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Ord Co Hvy Maint (A)	D plus 60	D
				1 Ord Bn Am (A)	D plus 60	D
				1 PT Oper Base plus M.E.O. (E11 & E12)	D plus 60	D
				1 Mob Hosp 1,000 Beds (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Medical Storehouse for 100,000 personnel (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Pontoon As- sembly Plant (P10)**	D plus 60	D
				1 Material Re- covery Unit (N)	D plus 90	D plus 30
				1 Mob Hosp (N)	D plus 90	D plus 30

** Recommend this unit be installed in a "Pontoon Fabricating Ship". This ship is distinct from "Pontoon Barge Assembly Depot Ship" requested by ComServPac in his serial 7987 of 13 December 1943.

APPENDIX "L"

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
				1 General De- pot (A) in South Pacific to support GYMKHANA- ROADMAKER Operation	D plus 90	D-150

3. FORAGER

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
SAIPAN	Air Base	Army	Army	5 Avn Eng Bn (A)	D	D-60
				3 Tank Farms 40,000 Bbl (H14A) (N)	D	D-60
				1 Tank Farm 12,000 bbl. (H14C) (N)	D	D-60
				1 AV Co (A)	D	D-60
				1 Comm Unit JCS-488	D	D-60
				1 Engr Rgt GS for tank farms & roads		D-60
				1 Gropac (N)*	D	D-60
				1 Port Bn (A)	D	D-60
				Grp Hq & Hq Sq VBVH (A)	D plus 15	D-45
				2 Eng Bn GS (A)	D plus 15	D-45
				3 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D plus 20	D-40
				1 PT Oper Base (Ell)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Laundry Co (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Hosp 250 Bed (A)	D plus 30	D-30

* See Page 8.

APPENDIX "L"

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	Date Required	
					At Target	Ready
				2 Hosp 500 Bed (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Bakery Co (A)	D plus 60	D
TINIAN	Air Base	Navy	Navy	2 Acorns (N)	D	D-60
				2 AT Sq (M)	D	D-60
				1 Patsu (N)	D	D-60
				1 Hq Sq MAG (M)	D	D-60
				1 Serv Sq MAG (H)	D	D-60
				1 Comm Unit JCS-488	D	D-60
				1 Gropac*(N)	D	D-60
				Laundry Facilities for Base (15,000 men) (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				Bakery Facilities for Base (15,000 men) (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				Naval Hospital Mob 1,000 Bed (N)	D plus 30	D-30
GUAM	Navy Air Base & Submarine Base	Navy	Army Navy Marine	1 Acorn	D plus 30	D-30
				3 Tank Farms 40,000 bbls (H14A)(N)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Tank Farm 12,000 bbls (H14C)(N)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Patsu	D plus 30	D-30
				3 Air Serv Support Sq (A)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 AT Sq (M)	D plus 30	D-30

* See Page 8

APPENDIX "L"

Base	Function	Adm.	Constr.	Base Services	<u>Date Required</u>	
					At Target	Ready
				3 CB (N) for tank farms & roads plus 75 ton crane	D plus 30	D-30
				1/2 CB Spe- cial (F-1) Additional (N)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Comm Unit JCS-488	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Hq Sq MAG (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Serv Sq MAG (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Marine Avn Eng Bn (M)	D plus 30	D-30
				1 Grp Hq & Hq Sq VBWH (A)	D plus 45	D-15
				2 Reg Avn Eng (A)	D plus 45	D-15
				1 Cub	D plus 45	D-15
				1 AS equiva- lent (E4) (N)	D plus 60	D
				2 Mob Hosp 1000 Bed (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 PT Oper Base (E11)	D plus 60	D
				1 Material Recovery Unit (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Port Devel- op. Unit (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Laundry Fa- cilities for Base (25,000 men) (N)	D plus 60	D
				1 Bakery Fac- ilities for Base (N) (25,000 men)	D plus 60	D

4. RESERVE.

The following units and equipment will be provided in Hawaiian Area by the commanders indicated to serve as a Central Pacific Area reserve by 15 March 1944, on a ten day readiness status:

APPENDIX "L"

UNIT

PROVIDED BY

(a) ~~1st Avn Eng~~ ~~PEARL~~

ComGonCentPac

(b) 1 Air Serv Support Sq sufficient to operate an airfield and to service one VF Sq and 1 VBH or 2 VBM squadrons

"

(c) Emergency stock of buildings required for Army Air Force Headquarters. These to be available for use for this specific purpose by either Army or Navy

"

(d) One Acorn (less Construction Bn)

ComAirPac

(e) One Argus

"

(f) One Communication Unit

"

(g) One Construction Bn.

ComServPac

(h) One Gropac

"

(i) One complete CB Allowance of equipment and material

Advance Base Construction Depot, PEARL

5. STANDARD GRO PAC

(a) A-3 Administration (Small).

(b) B4B Port Director (Medium).

(c) B4C Harbor Patrol.

(d) B5A Boat Pool (Less Landing Craft and Crews). Include the following pontoon equipment and personnel to operate - Total one officer and 36 men.

3 - 50 ton Pontoon Barges Self-Propelled (One fitted with a 50 ton crane).

3 - 100 ton N.S.P. Pontoon Barges.

6 - 50 ton N.S.P. Pontoon Barges.

3 - Pontoon Tugs.

4 - Spare Propulsion Units.

(e) D10 Storage Facilities (Small).

(f) E8 Small Boat Repair.

(g) E9 Amphibious Craft Repair (Motorized) Small.

(h) 2 - G10 Dispensary - 10 bed.

(i) J4A Bomb Disposal Unit.

(j) J4B Mine Disposal Unit.

(k) J4C Base Demolition.

(l) 2 NL 250 Camps (Tents), plus laundry hut and equipment.

(m) N6A 1000 Man Bakery.


(n) 1/4 F-1 Construction Battalion Special (Stevedore).

(o) 1/2 P-1 Construction Battalion.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~


GRANITE

4th Marines(Raider)




Employment of Troops and Assault Shipping - Appendix E

SECRET
SECURITY



FORAGER
General Scheme of Maneuver
APPENDIX K


SECRET
SECURITY



GRANITE
Scheme of Movement of Attack Forces


APPENDIX F

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY~~




FLINTLOCK
General Scheme of Maneuver
APPENDIX G

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY~~




~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY~~



CATCHPOLE
General Scheme of Maneuver
APPENDIX I

SECRET
SECURITY



ROADMAKER
GYMKHANA
General Scheme of Maneuver
APPENDIX J